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From the height of his 90 years of expe-
rience, Robert G. Shulman is not just a
veteran of World War II, but a world-class
biophysicist with a distinguished research
career spanning the California Institute of
Technology, Bell Labs, and Yale University.
A forerunner in the use of nuclear mag-
netic resonance, Shulman contributed
to the study of biochemical processes,
founded the Yale Magnetic Resonance
Research Center, and shepherded func-
tional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) as a dominant tool of cogni-
tive neuroscience. Together with Gregory
McCarthy et al., Shulman authored sev-
eral of the earliest fMRI studies, including
the first to explicitly manipulate cognitive
processes (McCarthy et al., 1993; Shulman
et al., 1993). As such, his ideas concerning
conscious research piqued our curiosity.
We read Brain Imaging: What It Can (and
Cannot) Tell Us About Consciousness with
anticipation.
Shulman comes full circle with his book
on brain imaging: although his career
spanned meaningful collaborations with
behavioral scientists and interactions with
researchers from preclinical and clinical
fields, he retreats to the comfort of the
biophysical sciences. Two prominent, but
related, hesitations give us pause regarding
his retreat. First, he claims that a behav-
iorist approach to brain imaging is rea-
sonable and pragmatic for the science of
consciousness. Second, he rebuffs subjec-
tive and phenomenal forms of evidence.
In this review we briefly address these two
points of contention.
Shulman advocates for a behavior-
ist approach to cognitive science that
espouses a stylized view of consciousness.
He disregards the subjective for the sake
of simplicity and, while he concedes that
behavior cannot account for experience,
he clearly posits subjective phenomena as
a modest extension of observable behav-
ior. For example, Shulman relies on acts
of consciousness, which consist of “a
person’s ability to recognize and decide
upon things” (p. 23) to support his ideas.
Despite this description, he defines these
acts of consciousness (and consciousness
itself) by observable behaviors and physi-
cal brain correlates (see p. 22) rather than
by the capacity to recognize or decide.
This conundrum rekindles the issue of
reverse inferences (Poldrack, 2006). If a
computer performed acts of consciousness
as part of a Turing-like test, we would
hardly regard the machine as conscious
because, as Searle has already argued in
the Chinese room argument, if a com-
puter or a human cannot semantically
process inputs then we cannot declare
it conscious (Preston and Bishop, 2002).
Shulman claims that acts of conscious-
ness do not require semantic processing.
Instead, he posits that these acts demar-
cate consciousness and simply require
“relevant background or experience” (p.
133). However, we differ from Shulman
when he claims that we must attain a
plane of consciousness in order to perform
acts of consciousness (p. 133). We also
take issue with his assertion that behav-
iorism constitutes a pragmatic approach
to cognitive science; for example, some
scholars argue that advances in artificial
intelligence, rather than neuroscience, will
sooner provide causal models of human
behavior (Harnad and Scherzer, 2008).
Taken together, we submit that cognitive
science ought not conflate behavior with
consciousness.
To understand consciousness, apart
from behavior, scientists may require
information that Shulman discards.
Similar to the emphasis Shulman places
on the difference between biological and
physical science when he points out the
tendency for biology to favor causal
models over laws (p. 32), we may dis-
cern the study of consciousness from the
study of biophysics. Novel neurophe-
nomenological frameworks are rising
to the challenge, helping scientists map
cognition using experiential reports, psy-
choanalytical methods, and hypnotic
suggestion (Cusumano and Raz, 2014;
Lifshitz et al., 2014). These frameworks
stem from an undercurrent of cognitive
science that has reliably gained momen-
tum over decades (Varela, 1999; Gallagher
and Zahavi, 2012). From a philosoph-
ical standpoint, phenomenal evidence
has always been compatible with the
behavioral evidence that Shulman seeks
(Schellenberg, 2013). Moreover, recent
experimental data have confirmed the
musings of philosophers. Petitmengin
and Lachaux, for example, demonstrate
that phenomenology and neuroimaging
can work side-by-side (2013); addi-
tional research by Petitmengin and her
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colleagues transcends philosophy to pro-
vide clinical applications (Petitmengin
et al., 2007; Petitmengin, 2010). As sci-
ence presses forward into the uncharted
territory of consciousness, reverting to
behaviorist methods would present a curi-
ous choice. After all, we are constantly
developing new tools for experiential dis-
covery that work alongside the pre-existing
neuroimaging assays Shulman helped
establish.
Despite his meaningful contributions
to neuroscience, Shulman conveys trepida-
tion bridging the gap between experience
and the brain. The historical failings of
cognitive science, which he references
extensively (p. 75–95), serve as fodder
for neuroskeptics (Uttal, 2001). In the
fifth chapter, he broadly covers the his-
tory of cognitive science, illustrating the
flaws in research trajectories of the past
and present. Unfortunately, he hardly pays
as much as a passing acknowledgement
to phenomenology. His solution to the
problem, instead of pressing forward, cen-
ters on rekindling behaviorism. However,
by removing first-person experiences from
his research methodology, albeit in the
name of pragmatism, Shulman ends up
studying but a subset of consciousness
defined by observable behavior. Although
Shulman, who draws upon the work
of Bennett and Hacker (2003; p. 55),
seems obliquely aware of this conun-
drum, he nonetheless chooses to leave it
unaddressed.
Regardless of how cognitive science
relates to phenomenology and behavior-
ism, this worthwhile read will likely inspire
continued discussion. Perhaps unknow-
ingly, Shulman and his peers juxtapose
phenomenology with empirical science.
Whether or not readers find such concur-
rence palatable, Shulman presents a well-
articulated account of behaviorist brain
imaging. Our reservations hinge less on
his advocacy for empirical and inductive
science, and more on his presupposition
that phenomenal and empirical evidence
remain mutually exclusive.
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